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Abstract
The article examines how government spending is determined in a closed
economy where the nominal wage is pre-set through contracts and the wage set-
ters have perfect foresight regarding subsequent policy decisions. The monetary
regime aﬀects government spending because: (i) with a pre-set nominal wage, a
given change in government spending has diﬀerent eﬀects on employment and
inflation under diﬀerent monetary regimes, and (ii) the authorities’ inclination
to expand government spending is aﬀected by the inflation rate which depends
on the monetary regime. If the costs related to inflation are high, a compari-
son between monetary regimes suggests that welfare is highest under nominal
income targeting where the nominal income target is determined to bring about
price stability.
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1 Introduction
The literature has discussed the choice of monetary regime in the context of notably
two questions, namely first to what exctent it is possible through the choice of monetary
regime to reach a reduction in inflation, and second to what extent the monetary regime
aﬀects output variability. The literature based on Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983) sees the choice of monetary regime as involving a trade-oﬀ
between inflation and output variation.1 The question of minimising output variation
has been the central issue in the more recent literature based on optimising foundations
and on the presence of nominal wage or price rigidities. In this literature, the optimal
monetary regime is seen as the regime which brings average output as close as possible
to potential output.2
Much less has been written on fiscal issues in the choice of monetary regime. Alesina
and Tabellini (1987) and Debelle and Fisher (1995) analyse how the monetary regime
impacts on the equilibrium levels of production and unemployment because the mone-
tary regime determines the size of inflation tax/seignorage which in turn aﬀects the tax
rate on production. Jensen (1994) examines how the loss of inflation tax/seignorage in
the case of low inflation leads to a rise in the tax rate on labour income which raises
natural unemployment due to a weaker incentive to work. A number of studies con-
sider issues related to the open economy, discussing the need for rules in a monetary
union and the strategic interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities under dif-
ferent exchange rate regimes.3 There is finally a literature which discusses the choice
of monetary regime under the assumption that the price level is determined by the
fiscal authority’s budget constraint.4
In this article, the relationship between on the one side the monetary regime and
on the other side the authorities’ inclination to pursue an expansive fiscal policy is
examined under the assumption that decisions on fiscal policy are made by a benevolent
government which optimises a representative individual’s utility. It is further assumed
that there is a short-term nominal rigidity which in the analysis takes the form of
one-period nominal wage contracts. The nominal wage contracts are pre-set at the
beginning of the period by optimising agents who have perfect foresight concerning the
authorities’ subsequent policy decisions when the nominal wage is determined. This
time sequence corresponds to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983). The economic framework is based on optimising foundations.
1See e.g. Rogoﬀ (1985) and Svensson (1997).
2See e.g. Goodfriend and King (1997), Erceg, Henderson and Levi (2000), and Gali (2002).
3See Agell, Calmfors and Jonsson (1996), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998, 2001), Caselli (2001),
Dixit (2001), Dixit and Lambertini (2001), and Ostrup (2000). There is further an extensive literature
which deals with the specific problems of the European Monetary Union, see e.g. Levine and Brociner
(1994).
4See e.g. Woodford (2001).
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Based on these assumptions regarding policy behaviour and economic structure, it
is demonstrated that the monetary regime aﬀects government spending through two
channels: (1) given a pre-set nominal wage, there are diﬀerences between monetary
regimes with respect to how a change in government spending aﬀects production and
inflation, and (2) the government’s inclination to expand government spending is af-
fected by the inflation rate which in turn is determined by the monetary regime. None
of these channels which provide for a connection between the monetary regime and
government spending, have previously been discussed in the literature.
Due to this impact of the monetary regime on government spending, diﬀerent
monetary regimes lead to diﬀerent levels of welfare. Government spending aﬀects the
representative individual’s utility and thus welfare because the individual derives util-
ity from public consumption, consisting of goods which are placed at the individual’s
disposal through the government budget, and because government spending aﬀects
the individual’s possibility of reaching utility through private consumption, consisting
of those goods which are bought directly from firms by the individuals. The finding
of monetary regimes having an eﬀect on welfare carries important policy conclusions.
In their choice of monetary regime, it should be taken into consideration not only to
what extent inflation can be reduced or - in the case of a stochastic model setting
- to what extent it is possible to improve the trade-oﬀ between inflation and output
variability. It should be considered also how the monetary regime has an eﬀect on the
representative individual’s utility by aﬀecting the size of government spending.
The article compares government spending under three types of monetary regime.
In the case of policy discretion, monetary policy is determined to optimise a repre-
sentative individual’s utility. Under inflation targeting, the monetary authority uses
monetary policy to optimise preferences which include an employment goal and a goal
of price stability. Finally, under nominal income targeting monetary policy is used to
maintain a specific growth in nominal income. It is demonstrated that government
spending at low rates of inflation is highest under nominal income targeting. This is
also the regime which at low rates of inflation brings government spending closest to
its optimal level. In the case where the monetary authority under nominal income
targeting can commit to a low rise in the nominal income target and thus to a low
rate of inflation and if the costs related to inflation are relatively high, it follows that
nominal income targeting should thus be preferred to the two other monetary regimes.
This argument in favour of nominal income targeting is additional to those which have
previously been discussed in the literature, in particular a better adjustment to supply
shocks and a stabilising eﬀect on inflation in the case where the monetary authority
is unable to pre-commit.5
5For a discussion regarding the optimnal adjustment to shocks, see e.g. Beetsma and Jensen
(1999), Feldstein and Stock (1994), Fischer (1995), Hall and Mankiw (1994), and McCallum and
Nelson (1999). Jensen (2202) considers the impact of nominal income targeting on inflation when
there is a staggered price setting and when the monetary authority is unable to precommit.
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Section 2 sets out the basic model. Section 3 derives natural employment. Section
4 considers how government spending is determined. Section 5 analyses government
spending under policy discretion where monetary policy is set to optimise the indi-
viduals’ utility. Section 6 examines inflation targeting. Section 7 considers nominal
income targeting. Section 8 compares the level of government spending under the
three monetary regimes. Section 9 discusses welfare implications. Section 10 brings a
summary and conclusion.
2 The model
The analysis is based on a standard model built on optimising foundations. The frame-
work is deterministic. There are four types of economic agents: (i) individuals who
optimise utility and who deliver a labour input to the firm, (ii) firms which deter-
mine production to optimise profit and which operate in competitive markets, (iii)
the government which makes decisions on government spending and thus on the tax
rate, and (iv) a monetary authority which controls the money supply. Individuals and
firms operate at the microeconomic level, taking prices, wages, and economic policy
variables as given in their optimisation.
The analysis considers, without loss of generality, a single time period. The in-
teraction between economic agents which takes place in the course of this period, is
repeated in all periods, implying that the analysis applies to a long-term equilibrium.
At the beginning of the period, the nominal wage is set in advance for one period at a
level which brings about equilibrium in the labour market during the contract period.
Subsequently, in the course of the time period and on the basis of the pre-set nominal
wage, the firm decides on employment and production while the individual determines
the consumption of goods and the size of money balances. Also in the course of the
time period, the government makes decisions on the level of government spending. An
assumption is made of a balanced government budget, government spending being fi-
nanced through a tax on production. In the case of a monetary regime based on policy
discretion, monetary policy decisions are made subsequent to the wage setting at the
same time as fiscal decisions, the aim of the monetary authority being to optimise the
utility of the representative individual. In the case of a monetary regime based on rules
in the form of inflation targeting or nominal income targeting, these rules are set in
advance prior to the government’s determination of government spending.
A distinction is made between two kinds of consumption which brings utility to the
representative individual: (i) private consumption, and (ii) public consumption. Private
consumption consists of those goods which are bought directly by the individual from
the firms and which is thus controlled by the individual. Public consumption consists of
those goods which are placed at the free disposal of the individual by the government,
e.g. welfare services or other public services. The individual cannot aﬀect the size
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of public consumption which is determined by the government at the macroeconomic
level. The government buys the goods which form part of public consumption from the
firms. The representative firm’s output is thus divided between private consumption
and public consumption.
Besides utility from private consumption and from public consumption, the indi-
vidual experiences utility from money holdings while there is disutility from work and
from inflation. The inclusion of inflation in the individual’s utility covers the negative
eﬀects which may result from inflation, e.g. costs related to the gathering of price
information and shopping time.6 The utility function of the representative individual
is
U = log(C) + ϑ log(G)− κ
ν
Lν + ρ log
µ
M
P
¶
− 1
2
χπ2,(1)
π ≡ p− p−1, p−1 ≡ 0, ϑ > 0, κ > 0, ν > 1, ρ > 0, χ > 0,
where U represents the utility of a representative individual,C the private consumption
of goods,G public consumption, L the supply of labour,M nominal money balances, P
the price on goods, and π inflation. The parameter ϑ expresses the utility from public
consumption, κ and ν the disutility from work, ρ the utility from money balances, and
χ the disutility associated with inflation. p is the log of the price level P .
The individual receives an income from work and from dividends. Dividends are
distributed lump-sum with an equal amount to each individual. In order to abstract
from the eﬀects arising from inflation tax/seignorage on the individual’s incentive
to work, it is assumed that the individual receives a lump-sum transfer from the
government which is equal to the real cost associated with holding money. This gives
the individual’s budget constraint as
(2)
W
P
L+ ψ +' = C + π
M
P
, ' = π
M
P
,
where W is the nominal wage, L employment, ψ dividends received by the represen-
tative individual, and ' a lump-sum transfer from the government, the size of which
corresponds to the individual’s loss of purchasing power related to holding money
balances.
The representative individual optimises the utility given by (1) under the budget
constraint (2) with respect to private consumption C, employment L, and money
balances M . In the optimisation, the individual takes prices P , the nominal wage W ,
public consumption G, dividends ψ, and government transfers ' as given. Optimising
(1) with respect to consumption C, employment L, and money balances M under the
6There is no agreement in economic theory as to the exact nature of these costs. A discussion is
found in Zhang (2000). The weight attached to inflation in policy discussions indicate, however, that
the costs may be considerable.
5
constraint of (2) gives:
κLν−1 = 1
C
µ
W
P
¶
,(3)
M
P
= C
³ρ
π
´
.(4)
Equation (3) shows the labour supply as a function of consumption and of the real
wage. The left-hand side reflects the marginal disutility from work while the right-
hand side is the increase in utility which results from a further work eﬀort. (1/C) is
the marginal utility from private consumption while the real wageW/P represents the
rise in real income which can be reached by an increase in employment. (4) represents
the demand for money balances.
We next consider the representative firm. The firm produces a single good which
is used for private consumption and for public consumption. The firm operates under
perfect competition in product markets. A tax is levied on the firm’s production. The
firm maximises
(5) Π = (1− τ)Y − W
P
L, 1 ≥ τ ≥ 0,
where Π is real profit for the representative firm, τ the tax rate on production, and Y
production.
The firm uses a labour input for production. The production technology is given
as
(6) Y = Lα, 1 > α > 0,
where α is the elasticity of production with respect to labour.
Optimising (5) with respect to labour and using the production function specified
by (6) gives the firm’s demand for labour as
(7) L1−α = α(1− τ)
µ
W
P
¶−1
.
We next turn to the government. There is a balanced government budget. All govern-
ment spending is used for public consumption. Due to the assumption made in (2) of
inflation tax/seignorage being returned to the individuals through lump-sum transfers,
government spending equals the tax revenue which is derived from the tax imposed
on production. This gives the condition for the government budget as
(8) g = τ , g ≡ G
Y
,
where g shows government spending relative to production.
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Production is used for either private consumption or for public consumption, im-
plying that Y = C +G. Using (8), this can be expressed as
(9) C = Y (1− g).
Equation (9) gives the condition for equilibrium on the goods market, showing private
consumption to equal production with the deduction of public consumption.
3 Natural employment
The nominal wage is set at the beginning of the time period through a contract at such
a level that there is equilibrium on the labour market in the course of the contract
period.7 There is perfect foresight among firms and individuals concerning the policy
setting which takes place subsequently during the wage contract period. The supply
of labour is determined by the condition for the individual’s optimisation with respect
to work, shown by (3), while the demand for labour is determined from the firm’s
optimisation with respect to employment, given by (7). Combining (3) with (6), (7),
and (9) gives
(10) L0 =
³α
κ
´ 1
ν ,
where L0 is the employment which is realised in the course of the wage contract period,
in the following referred to as the natural employment.
It follows from (10) that natural employment lies at an exogenously given level,
being determined only by the production structure and by the individual’s preferences
with respect to work.
4 The determination of fiscal policy
The government determines government spending to optimise the representative indi-
vidual’s utility given by (1). In line with the literature, we neglect the utility which
arises from money balances.8 The government thus sets government spending to opti-
mise preferences that are given as
(11) V g = log(C) + ϑ log(G)− κ
ν
Lν − 1
2
χπ2,
7No diﬀerence in the basic findings would result if it had alternatively been assumed that the
nominal wage is determined by a representative individual who is in a monopoly position in the
labour market. For simplicity, we have chosen the assumption that the nominal wage is set at a level
which brings about equilibrium in the labour market.
8See e.g. the ’New Open-Economy Macroeconomics’ literature based on Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1995).
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where V g expresses the government’s preferences.
Optimising (11) with respect to government spending and using (8)-(9), gives the
condition for the government’s determination of fiscal policy
(12)
∂V g
∂g
= −
µ
1
1− g
¶
+ ϑ
µ
1
g
¶
+
h
1 + ϑ− κ
α
Lν
iµ∂y
∂g
¶
− χπ
µ
∂p
∂g
¶
= 0,
where y is the log of production Y .
Equation (12) shows the increase in utility which can be reached by the government
from a rise in government spending. There are four eﬀects. The first term in ∂V g/∂g
shows the decrease in utility which follows because a rise in government spending,
and thus in the tax rate, lowers private consumption. The second term in ∂V g/∂g
expresses the rise in utility which results from a rise in public consumption. The third
term in ∂V g/∂g shows the impact on utility which follows because a given change
in government spending may aﬀect production, a change in production having an
impact on utility because it aﬀects the utility which is derived from private and public
consumption and the disutility which is caused by an increase in the work eﬀort.
Finally, the fourth term in ∂V g/∂g reflects the impact on utility which arises because
government spending may aﬀect inflation.
It follows from the condition for the individual’s optimisation with respect to
labour, given by (10), that (κ/α)Lν = 1. Combining (12) with (10), the condition
for the government’s optimisation with respect to government spending can thus be
expressed as
(13) g =
ϑ
1 + ϑ− Φ , Φ ≡ ϑ(1− g)
µ
∂y
∂g
¶
− πχ(1− g)
µ
∂p
∂g
¶
,
where Φ is a functional relationship which depends on inflation and on the eﬀects
which a change in government spending has on production and on the price level.
The condition shown by equation (13) expresses how government spending is
determined. Government spending relative to production is increased when there is
a rise in Φ. It results that government spending relative to production is determined
by (i) the eﬀects which a given rise in government spending has on production and on
inflation, expressed by respectively ∂y/∂g and ∂p/∂g, and (ii) the rate of inflation π.
The government opts for a higher level of government spending if a given rise in govern-
ment spending has a bigger eﬀect on production, implying that ∂y/∂g increases, and
a smaller eﬀect on inflation, implying that ∂p/∂g becomes smaller. It further follows
that government spending to a larger extent will be determined by the consideration
to reduce inflation when inflation is high. In the case where government spending
raises inflation, that is, if ∂p/∂g > 0, government spending relative to production is
negatively aﬀected by inflation.
The condition for the determination of government spending shown by (13) is cen-
tral in the analysis. We will demonstrate in the following that the monetary regime
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aﬀects the condition (13) - and thus the level of government spending - through two
channels. First, the monetary regime determines the impact which a given change
in government spending has on production and on the price level, that is, the mon-
etary regime determines ∂y/∂g and on ∂p/∂g. Second, the monetary regime aﬀects
government spending because the monetary regime determines the level of inflation π.
5 Policy discretion
We will next consider how government spending is determined under a monetary
regime where monetary policy is set discretely to optimise the individual’s utility.
In line with the literature, we disregard the impact of money balances on utility. The
monetary authority’s preferences are thus given as
(14) V m = log(C) + ϑ log(G)− κ
ν
Lν − 1
2
χπ2,
where V m shows the monetary authority’s preferences.
Optimising (14) with respect to the money supply and using (8)-(9) gives the
condition for the monetary authority’s optimisation as
(15)
h
1 + ϑ− κ
α
Lν
iµ ∂y
∂m
¶PD
− χπPD
µ
∂p
∂m
¶PD
= 0,
where the superscript PD denotes policy discretion. m is the log of the money supply
M .
Monetary policy and government spending are determined after the nominal wage
has been pre-set through contracts. This implies that the authorities in their deci-
sions on monetary and fiscal policies base themselves on the eﬀects which government
spending and the money supply have on production and on the price level in a short-
term model characterised by a pre-set nominal wage. Combining the condition for the
firm’s optimisation with respect to employment, shown by (7), with the condition for
the individual’s optimisation with respect to money balances, expressed by (4), and
with (6) and (8)-(9) gives the equation system
y = − α
1− α(w − p) +
α
1− α log(1− g) +
α
1− α log(α),(16)
m− p = y + log(1− g)− log(π) + log(ρ).(17)
Equations (16) and (17) expresses the economic system on the basis of which the au-
thorities determine monetary policy and government spending. (16) shows the supply
of goods as a function of the real wage and government spending while (17) represents
money market equilibrium. In the case of a pre-set nominal wage, equations (16) and
9
(17) determine production y and the price level p as functions of government spending
relative to production g and of the money supply m.
Given a pre-set nominal wage, we derive from (16) and (17) the impact of changes
in the money supply on production and the price level as
(18)
µ
∂y
∂m
¶PD
= α > 0,
µ
∂p
∂m
¶PD
= 1− α > 0.
It follows from (18) that a rise in the money supply increases production and the
price level. Using (18) in (15) and further using from (10) that (κ/α)Lν = 1, gives the
condition for the monetary authority’s optimisation as
(19) πPD =
µ
ϑ
χ
¶µ
α
1− α
¶
.
Equation (19) shows that inflation under policy discretion is determined by (i) the
utility which the individual derives from public consumption, expressed by ϑ, and (ii)
the disutility which the individual experiences from inflation, shown by χ.
Corresponding to the monetary authority, the government determines government
spending on the basis of the nominal wage which has been pre-set at the beginning
of the period. We derive from (16) and (17) the impact of government spending on
production as
(20)
µ
∂y
∂g
¶PD
= 0,
µ
∂p
∂g
¶PD
=
1
1− g > 0.
It follows from (20) that production is unaﬀected by a rise in government spending
relative to production while there is a positive impact on the price level.
Combining (19) and (20) with (14), the condition for the determination of govern-
ment spending is
(21) gPD =
ϑ
1 + ϑ− ΦPD , Φ
PD ≡ −ϑ
µ
α
1− α
¶
.
Equation (21) shows how government spending is determined under a monetary regime
which implies discretion in the setting of monetary policy.
6 Inflation targeting
We will next examine government spending in the case where the monetary authority
adjusts the money supply to optimise preferences which include an inflation target and
a target of bringing employment close to a desired level. We refer to this regime as
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inflation targeting. There is an exogenously determined diﬀerence between the employ-
ment desired by the monetary authority and the natural employment. The monetary
authority optimises
(22) V m = − (l − l00)2 − χmπ2, χm > 0, l00 − l0 = h > 0, h = h,
where l00 is the monetary authority’s desired employment (logarithmic value), χm is
the weight which the monetary authority attaches to inflation, and h is the diﬀerence
between the monetary authority’s desired employment and natural employment.
The monetary authority optimises (22) with respect to the money supply on the
basis of the pre-set nominal wage, i.e. on the basis of equations (16) and (17). Opti-
mising (22) and using (16) and (17) gives the price and employment levels which are
compatible with the monetary authority’s optimisation:
(23) πIT = − 1
χm
(l − l00)
µ
1
1− α
¶
,
where the superscript IT denotes inflation targeting.
The government acts on the basis of the monetary rule expressed by (23) when it
determines government spending. Given a pre-set nominal wage, it follows from (23)
in combination with (16) that the impact of government spending on production and
on the price level isµ
∂y
∂g
¶IT
= −
µ
1
1− gIT
¶µ
α
1− α
¶µ
1
A
¶
< 0,(24) µ
∂p
∂g
¶IT
=
µ
1
1− gIT
¶µ
A− 1
A
¶
> 0,
A ≡ 1 +
µ
1
χm
¶µ
1
1− α
¶2
> 0,
where A is a term.
It follows from (24) that a rise in government spending under inflation targeting
reduces production and increases the price level. This can be explained as follows. A
rise in government spending implies a higher tax on production, causing an increase
in production costs which induces firms to lower production. It follows from the mon-
etary authority’s reaction function, shown by (23), that lower production induces the
monetary authority to pursue a more expansive monetary policy. Due to the monetary
authority’s accomodative policy reaction, a rise in government spending causes a rise
in the price level. A larger weight attached by the monetary authority to inflation -
shown by a rise in χm - means that the monetary authority will be less accomodative
with respect to countering the eﬀects of higher government spending on production,
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implying that a rise in government spending leads to a bigger fall in production and a
smaller rise in the price level.
Firms and individuals have perfect foresight concerning the authorities’ policy set-
ting when the nominal wage is determined. This means that employment lies at the
natural level, implying that l− l00 = h. Using this in (24) gives inflation under inflation
targeting as
(25) πIT =
µ
h
χm
¶µ
1
1− α
¶
.
Equation (25) shows inflation as determined by the diﬀerence between the authorities’
desired employment and the natural employment, shown by h, and by the monetary
authority’s preferences with respect to inflation, expressed by χm. This corresponds to
the standard Barro-Gordon model.
Combining (24) and (25) with the condition for the government’s optimisation
shown by (14) gives:
gIT =
ϑ
1 + ϑ− ΦIT ,(26)
ΦIT ≡ −
h
ϑαh+ χ
¡
πIT
¢2i £
(1− α)h+
¡
πIT
¢¤−1 < 0,
∂ΦIT
∂πIT
> 0, if πIT < −(1− α)h+
s
(1− α)2h2 +
µ
ϑαh
χ
¶
,
∂ΦIT
∂πIT
< 0, if πIT > −(1− α)h+
s
(1− α)2h2 +
µ
ϑαh
χ
¶
.
Equation (26) specifies government spending under inflation targeting. Government
spending is a positive function of ΦIT . At relatively low non-negative rates of inflation,
ΦIT and thus the level of government spending gIT is increased when there is a rise in
inflation, implying that government spending at low non-negative rates of inflation is
a positive function of inflation. If inflation increases above a certain level, government
spending is reduced by a further rise in inflation. This can be explained as follows.
A low inflation rate corresponds to a high value of χm, implying that there will be
a relatively big fall in production when there is a rise in government spending, cf.
(24). This eﬀect induces the government to hold back on government spending at
a low inflation. When inflation is increased due to a reduction in χm, the fall in
production resulting from a rise in government spending becomes smaller, implying
that the government becomes more inclined to expand government spending, thus
explaining the positive relationship between inflation and government spending at low
inflation rates. As, however, inflation rises to a higher level, the welfare loss from a
further rise in inflation becomes more important, implying that the government to a
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larger extent will be inclined to determine government spending from the consideration
to reduce inflation. This stronger discipline arising from inflation explains why there
will be a negative relationship between inflation and government spending after a
certain rate of inflation has been reached.
7 Nominal income targeting
We finally examine how government spending is determined in the case of nominal
income targeting, defined as a monetary regime where the monetary authority adjusts
the money supply to maintain a specific level of nominal income. Nominal income
targeting implies
(27) p+ y = n,
where n is the target for nominal income.
The government acts on the basis of the monetary rule shown by (27) when it
determines government spending. In the case of a pre-set nominal wage, it results from
(27) in combination with (16) that the impact of government spending on production
and on the price level is
(28)
µ
∂y
∂g
¶NI
= −α
µ
1
1− gNI
¶
< 0,
µ
∂p
∂g
¶NI
= α
µ
1
1− gNI
¶
> 0.
where the superscript NI denotes nominal income targeting.
It follows from (28) that a rise in government spending decreases production under
nominal income targeting while there is an increase in the price level. These diﬀerent
eﬀects of government spending on production and on the price level follows from the
nominal income target which means that any reduction in production is matched by
a corresponding increase in the price level.
In an equilibrium situation where production lies at the same level in each time
period, the pursuit of a nominal income target implies that inflation is determined by
the rise in the nominal income target relative to the preceding period. Assuming an
equilibrium situation, combining (16) with (7), (14), and (28), thus gives the setting
of government spending as
gNI =
ϑ
1 + ϑ− ΦNI ,(29)
ΦNI ≡ −αϑ− αχπNI , πNI = n− n−1,
where n−1 is the nominal income target in the previous period.
Equation (29) specifies the condition for government spending under nominal in-
come targeting, assuming an equilibrium situation with the same production in each
period. It follows that a rise in inflation under nominal income targeting decreases
government spending.
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8 Comparison between monetary regimes
We will next compare the levels of government spending under the three monetary
regimes which have been analysed above. The analysis is complicated by the feature
that government spending under inflation targeting and under nominal income target-
ing depends on the rate of inflation. Under inflation targeting, inflation is determined
by the weight which the monetary authority attaches to inflation χm while inflation
under nominal income targeting is determined by the rise in the nominal income target.
It follows from (26) that government spending under inflation targeting is increased by
higher inflation up to a certain level of inflation. Above this level, government spending
falls when there is a further rise in inflation. In the case of nominal income targeting,
government spending is reduced by higher inflation, cf. (29). Under policy discretion,
inflation and government spending lie at specific levels, given by respectively (19) and
(21).
Comparing the levels of government spending under the three monetary regimes,
determined by (21), (26), and (29), at given inflation rates under inflation targeting
and nominal income targeting leads to the following conclusion:
gNI > gIT = gPD, if πIT = πNI = 0,(30)
gNI > gIT > gPD, if αh > πIT > 0, Λ αh > πNI > 0,
gIT > gNI > gPD, if πPD > πIT > αh, Λ πPD > πNI > αh,
gIT = gNI = gPD, if πIT = πNI = πPD,
gPD > gNI > gIT , if πIT > πPD, Λ πNI > πPD,
πPD =
µ
ϑ
χ
¶µ
α
1− α
¶
.
It follows from (30) that in the case of price stability under inflation and nominal
income targeting, government spending is highest under nominal income targeting
while there is the same government spending under inflation targeting and policy
discretion. When inflation rates under inflation targeting and nominal income targeting
are positive but below a certain level given as αh, government spending is highest
under nominal income targeting, second-highest under inflation targeting, and lowest
under policy discretion. When inflation under inflation targeting and under nominal
income targeting is above αh but lies below the inflation rate under policy discretion
πPD, government spending is highest under inflation targeting, second-highest under
nominal income targeting, and lowest under policy discretion. In the case where the
monetary authority under inflation targeting and nominal income targeting opts for
an inflation rate which is equal to the rate that is realised under policy discretion,
government spending lies at the same level under all three regimes. Finally, for inflation
rates under inflation targeting and nominal income targeting which lie above the level
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under policy discretion πPD, government spending is highest under policy discretion,
second-highest under nominal income targeting, and lowest under inflation targeting.
9 Welfare implications
The optimal government spending corresponds to the level which would follow from
a benevolent government’s optimisation if it could pre-commit, implying that it could
determine government spending prior to the wage setting. In the case where govern-
ment spending is determined prior to the wage setting, the government bases its fiscal
decisions on the eﬀect which government spending has on the production level that
corresponds to natural employment. It follows from (10) that government spending
does not impact on natural employment. Correspondingly, government spending has
no impact on inflation under any of the three monetary regimes, cf. (19), (25), and
(29). As government spending aﬀects neither natural production nor inflation, it re-
sults that optimal government spending corresponds to the level which results from
the optimisation of (11) under the constraints that ∂y/∂g = 0 and ∂π/∂g = 0. This
gives the condition for the optimal government spending as
(31) g00 =
ϑ
1 + ϑ
,
where g00 is the optimal government spending, corresponding to the level which would
be determined by a benevolent government which makes decisions prior to the wage
setting.
The condition specified by (31) corresponds to the case where Φ = 0 in the con-
dition shown by (13) Comparing (31) with the levels of government spending under
the three monetary regimes, specified by the conditions (21), (26), and (29), it results
that government spending under all three regimes is lower than optimal government
spending:
(32) gPD < g00, gIT < g00, gNI < g00.
It follows from (32) that there is a restrictive bias in the fiscal policy setting which
causes government spending to be set at a too level. This restrictive bias arises because
the government determines government spending subsequent to the wage setting, thus
acting on the basis of a short-term economic model where the nominal wage is given.
In this short-term model, government spending is kept back under all three monetary
regimes by a positive eﬀect on the price level and - in the case of inflation targeting
and nominal income targeting - by a negative impact on production. If the government
had determined government spending prior to the wage setting, the government would
have based its fiscal decisions on a situation with no impact of government spending
on production and inflation.
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The optimal monetary regime is the regime which both leads to low inflation and
which brings about the optimal level of government spending. If the cost associated
with inflation is relatively high, implying that high inflation rates should be avoided,
it results that the best situation can be reached under nominal income targeting where
the nominal income target is designed in such a way that price stability is maintained.
In this case, there is price stability and at the same time government spending is
brought closer to the optimal level than under the two other regimes. In the case where
the costs associated with inflation are smaller, we find from a comparison between
(26), (29), and (31) that government spending is brought closer to its optimal level
under inflation targeting than under a nominal income target with price stability if
the following condition is met
1
2
χαϑ(1− E) < πIT < 1
2
χαϑ(1 +E),(33)
E ≡
s
1− 4
µ
hχ
ϑ
¶
, 1 > 4
µ
hχ
ϑ
¶
,
where E is a term.
If the condition given by (33) is met, implying that inflation under inflation tar-
geting lies within the range indicated by the first line of (33) and implying that
1 > 4(hχ/ϑ), government spending is closer to the optimal level under inflation tar-
geting than under nominal income targeting. In this case, inflation targeting should
be preferred to a nominal income target regime where the nominal income target is
designed so as to bring about price stability if the cost related to inflation is relatively
low while the utility from bringing government spending closer to the optimal level
is relatively high. Otherwise, the authorities should prefer nominal income targeting
designed so as to bring about price stability. In the case where the condition given by
(33) cannot be met because 4(hχ/ϑ) > 1, nominal income targeting designed at price
stability is the optimal regime regardless of the inflation rate under inflation targeting.
10 Summary and conclusion
The article has analysed how a benevolent government determines government spend-
ing under diﬀerent monetary regimes when there is a short-term nominal rigidity in the
form of wage contracts. It is the main finding from the analysis that the government’s
fiscal decisions are aﬀected by the monetary regime through two channels. First, as the
government determines government spending on the basis of nominal wage contracts,
there are diﬀerences between monetary regimes with respect to the eﬀects which a
given rise in government spending has on production and on inflation. Second, when
the government makes decisions on government spending, it takes into account to what
extent a rise in government spending has negative welfare implications by raising the
16
price level. As the negative welfare eﬀect arising from a further rise in the price level
depends on the level of inflation, it follows that a benevolent government attaches a
larger weight to the reduction of inflation in the setting of government spending when
inflation is high. In a comparison between three monetary regimes - policy discretion,
inflation targeting, and nominal income targeting - it has been found that the high-
est welfare is realised under nominal income targeting designed to bring about price
stability if the costs associated with inflation are relatively high.
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